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DOMESTIC RELATIONS -ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS -
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS WAIVING ALIMONY ARE 
NOT VOID PER SE. Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552,471 A.2d 705 (1984). 
After eight years of marriage, a wife sued her husband for divorce 
a mensa et thoro, 1 child support, and other relief. Her husband raised 
preliminary objections to the request for alimony based on an antenup-
tial agreement waiving all claims for alimony or support.2 The trial 
court, relying on Maryland decisional law, declared the antenuptial 
agreement null and void as against public policy and awarded the wife 
alimony pendente lz~e and child support.3 On appeal,4 the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland in Frey v. Frey 5 held that antenuptial agreements 
waiving alimony are no longer void ab im~io as contrary to public 
policy.6 
Common law favored agreements made in contemplation of mar-
riage.7 These agreements are considered contracts and thus must com-
port with the general contract principles of fairness and consideration.8 
Moreover, the state, because of the special nature of these contracts, 
I. Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984). Divo;ce a mensa et thoro is a 
partial divorce that terminates cohabitation, but does not otherwise affect the legal 
marital status. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 431 (5th ed. 1979). Divorce a 
vinculo matrimonii completely dissolves the marriage bond. ld 
2. Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 554, 471 A.2d 705, 706 (1984). As to the issue of 
maintenance the agreement provides in pertinent part: 
That in the event of any separation by the parties for any reason, the 
parties hereto agree that they shall release and waive any claims for ali-
mony pendente lite, permanent alimony, or support or maintenance of 
any other type and description, as the result of such separation, or as the 
result of any differences between the parties. 
Brief and Appendix of Appellee at 5, Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 
(1984). 
3. Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 555, 471 A.2d 705, 706 (1984). Alimony pendente lite is 
a temporary provision of support made pending a suit for divorce. See BLACK's 
LAW DICTIONARY 67 (5th ed. 1979). 
4. The husband appealed and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted his writ of 
certiorari, prior to consideration by the court of special appeals because of the 
important public policy issue. The court of appeals first disposed of the jurisdic-
tional issue by noting appealability under Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CooE ANN. 
§ 12-303(c)(5) (1984), which permits an appeal from an interlocutory circuit court 
order for the payment of money. Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 555, 471 A.2d 705, 
707 (1984). 
5. 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984). 
6. ld at 563, 471 A.2d at 710. The court of appeals remanded the proceeding to the 
trial court for a factual determination as to the validity of the agreement. 
7. C. VERNIER, AMERICAN fAMILY LAWS 51 (Vol. III 1935). As early as 1866, 
Maryland courts recognized the lawfulness of antenuptial agreements. For exam-
ple, in Naill v. Maurer, 25 Md. 532 (1866), the court of appeals enforced an ante-
nuptial contract barring the wife's dower rights since she entered into it in good 
faith, and with a full and clear understanding of its purpose. See also Schnepfe v. 
Schnepfe, 124 Md. 330, 92 A. 891 (1914) (enforcing antenuptial agreement provid-
ing for cash payment in lieu of dower despite wife's abandonment of her hus-
band); Busey Ex'r. v. McCurley, 61 Md. 436 (1883) (enforcing antenuptial 
agreement where wife waived her dower rights in exchange for a house). 
8. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 27 (1968). 
1984) Antenuptial Agreements Waiving Alimony 201 
requires additional safeguards before it will enforce the agreement. 
For example, to protect the public interest in preserving the marital 
relationship, the state is considered a third party to every marital con-
tract.9 In this role the state defines the marital relationship, the J'roce-
dures for dissolution, and the attending duties and benefits. 1 The 
courts will not enforce private contracts that interfere with targeted ar-
eas of state interest, such as spousal and child support. 11 Also, since the 
special relationship of those engaged to be married is ill served by the 
arm's length standard of commercial contracts, 12 some courts have con-
sistently applied a higher standard of review when determining the va-
lidity of marriage contracts. 13 In effect, this approach reflects an 
attempt to strike a balance between the state's interest in preserving 
marriage and the citizens' right to contract freely. 14 
Historically, antenuptial agreements defining property distribution 
and rights to support upon divorce implicated two areas of state con-
cern. First, the state had an interest in preserving marriage because it 
was considered the foundation of society. The moral, economic, and 
social well-being of the citizenry was seen as directly dependent upon 
the stability of the family. 15 Thus, antenuptial agreements inducing 
separation or divorce were void as against public policy 16 even if the 
9. Comment, The Modem Theory and Practice of Antenuptial Agreements, 5 J. MAR. 
J. PRAc. & PRoc. 179, 179-80 (1971). But if. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Mar-
riage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1169 (1974) (in view of changing 
societal and individual needs the state's interest is no longer significant enough to 
justify its interference in the private marital relationship). 
10. See Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CooE ANN. §§ 3-6A-01 to -08 (1984) (Marital Prop-
erty Act); Mo. FAM. LAw. CooE ANN.§§ 7-101 to -105, 8-101 to -103, 11-101 to-
Ill (1984) (alimony provisions). 
II. H. CLARK, supra note 8, at 28-29, citing Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 165 
P.2d 209 (1946); Hilbert v. Hilbert, 168 Md. 364, 177 A. 914 (1935); Franch v. 
McAnamey, 290 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. 
App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 5 Wis. 2d 146, 92 N.W.2d 
356 (1958); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950). 
12. For a discussion of one court's application of the commercial conscionability stan-
dard to an antenuptial contract, see Note, Antenuptial Contracts Contingent Upon 
Divorce are Not Invalid Per Se: Ferry v. Ferry, 46 Mo. L. REv. 228 (1981). 
13. Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. 
App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 
(1973); see also Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1242-43. 
14. Comment, supra note 9, at 179. 
15. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1242-43. 
16. See, e.g., In reMarriage of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586 (Iowa 1973) (antenuptial 
agreements are void ab initio, not just on the facts of each case); Cohn v. Cohn, 
209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 ( 1956) (where the amount of the award upon divorce 
was directly related to the length of the marriage, the court likened it to "sever-
ance pay" rather than an equitable settlement of property rights); Duncan v. 
Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (provision limiting spouse's liabil-
ity for alimony is conducive to divorce); if. Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 320 
N.E.2d 506 (1974) (invalidated agreement that waived alimony if either party 
sought a divorce within seven years of the marriage); Norris v. Norris, 174 
N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970) (innocent party will have to endure conduct which would 
constitute grounds for divorce because an agreement made inadequate provision 
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agreements were otherwise valid. 17 Substantial changes in the public's 
attitude toward marriage and divorce, however, have weakened this in-
terest. The state has no interest in preserving failed marriages, as evi-
denced by the liberalized divorce laws in many states. 18 Further, the 
traditional roles of husband and wife are no longer rigidly defined. 
The new economic and social equality between the spouses and in-
creased participation of women in the economy mitigate the need for 
the court's continued patemalism. 19 Indeed, many courts now suggest 
that antenuptial agreements may actually promote marital stability.20 
The second area of state interest implicated was spousal support. 
Specifically, the state wanted to prevent its citizens from becoming 
wards of the state and thereby a drain on the public coffers.21 Indeed, 
the state interest was so strong that support is considered an essential of 
marriage.22 States thus prohibited agreements regulating support be-
cause the duty of spousal support was defined by law and could not be 
altered by contract.23 Agreements regulating property, however, were 
allowed because, unlike support, property was not considered an essen-
tial of marriage. 24 
In Cohn v. Cohn, 25 the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized 
the state's interest in preserving marriage and supporting its citizens. 26 
In Cohn, the court ruled that antenuptial agreements barring alimony 
for support). But see H. CLARK, supra note 8, at 28 (agreement providing induce-
ment for one party to seek divorce will often have the. opposite effect on the other 
party). 
17. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1263 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 586 
(1932)). 
18. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1264. One court interpreted the statutory change as 
legislative support of amicable settlement of disputes within marriage. Newman 
v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 731 (Colo. 1982). 
19. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1266-68; see, e.g., Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 
131,531 P.2d 176 (1975); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331,352 N.E.2d 
785 (1976). 
20. See, e.g., Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975); Newman v. 
Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 
(Fla. 1962); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Buettner v. 
Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 
P.2d 719 (1973); Schutterle v. Schutterle, 260 N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 1977). 
21. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1260. 
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 190 comment a (1979). 
23. Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. 
App. 3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331, 
352 N.E.2d 785 (1976); In re Marriage of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586 (Iowa 
1973); Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1977); Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 
190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124,42 N.W.2d 500 (1950). 
24. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
25. 209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956). 
26. ld at 475, 121 A.2d at 706. The court found the Cohn agreement, though exe-
cuted with full disclosure of the husband's assets, to have directly induced the 
husband's desertion of his wife. The agreement provided for a lump sum award 
to the wife in lieu of property and support. The amount of the award was deter-
mined by the number of years of marriage: the longer the marriage the larger the 
award. The husband deserted his wife just days before a scheduled increase. The 
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were per se invalid.27 Maryland followed the Cohn rule for twenty-
eight years until it was expressly renounced in Frey v. Frey 28 as no 
longer responsive to the public interest.29 In doing so Maryland joined 
the majority of jurisdictions, which have abandoned the absolute pro-
hibition of these agreements in favor of a case by case approach. 30 
The case by case approach in antenuptial cases evolved from the 
changes in marital roles and the public attitude toward marriage and 
divorce. 31 The Cohn decision was based on the preservation of mar-
riage32 and support of spouses, 33 but subsequent increased public inter-
est in dissolving failed marriages has since prompted states to enact 
more liberal divorce laws.34 By implication, this has severely weakened 
the state's interest in preserving marriage. Furthermore, in questioning 
whether antenuptial agreements induce divorce, some states have con-
cluded that these agreements actually encourage marital stability by 
permitting advance determination of the parties' respective property in-
terests.35 Thus, the state's interest in preserving marriage is no longer a 
basis for a per se prohibition of these agreements. 
It is not as easy to dispose of the state's interest in spousal support, 
particularly upon separation or divorce.36 At the very least the state is 
concerned that its citizens shall not become public wards.37 This inter-
est, coupled with the special relationship of the parties, has prompted a 
compromise between freedom of contract principles and the absolute 
prohibition rule. The modem trend jurisdictions have developed a new 
approach holding that the agreements are not void per se, but they will 
be closely scrutinized for fraud, overreaching and unconscionability, 
court thus concluded that the terms of the agreement induced his desertion. /d. at 
477, 121 A.2d at 707. 
27. /d. at 477, 121 A.2d at 707. 
28. 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984). 
29. /d. at 558, 471 A.2d at 708. 
30. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Parniawski v. Parniaw-
ski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Singer v. Singer, 318 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 
1975); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Unander v. 
Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973). 
31. See, e.g., Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975); Newman v. 
Newman, 653 P.Jd 728 (Colo. 1982); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 
44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Volid v. 
Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. 
App. 331, 352 N.E.2d 785 (1976); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 
(1973). 
32. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text. 
33. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text. 
34. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1264; see also MD. FAM. LAW CoDE ANN. § 7-103 
(1984). 
35. See supra note 20. 
36. Comment, For Better Or For Worse . . . . But Just In Case, Are Antenuptial 
Agreements Enforceable?, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 531. Only four jurisdictions lack 
alimony or spousal support statutes. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1185 n.77. 
37. One commentator has argued that this is the extent of the state's interest. Weitz-
man, supra note 9, at 1244. 
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and may be invalidated on that basis.38 
Courts thus subject support contracts to close scrutiny. The vari-
ous tests developed by the courts for this purpose have emphasized 
three general areas of concern: whether the agreement was validly pro-
cured; whether the agreement was fair in result; and determining which 
party has the burden of proving the validity of the agreement. 
In determining valid procurement, the presence of fraud, duress, 
or misrepresentation can invalidate an antenuptial agreement.39 The 
agreement must be executed voluntarily, with knowledge of its content 
and legal effect.40 The use of independent legal counsel, though not 
required, is. probative of validity.41 Most importantly, many courts 
have required either actual knowledge or some degree of disclosure of 
financial worth.42 
The adequacy43 of the agreement's provisions is considered under 
the second area of concern: fairness in result. Since this element most 
38. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Parniawski v. Parniaw-
ski, 33 Conn. Supp .. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Burtoff v. Burtoff, 419 A.2d 1085 
(D.C. 1980); Singer v. Singer, 318 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1975); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. 
App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d 
629 (1978); Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Ferry v. 
Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 
P.2d 600 (1973); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960); Unander v. 
Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973). Some courts have held that parties 
may contract but the court has ultimate authority as to whether to enforce the 
agreement. See, e.g., Flora v. Flora, 166 Ind. App. 620, 337 N.E.2d 846 (1975); 
Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44 (S.D. 1978); Schutterle v. Schutterle, 260 
N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 1977). Contra In reMarriage of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586 
(Iowa 1973); Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970); Mulford v. Mulford, 
211 Neb. 747, 320 N.W.2d 470 (1982); Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 
App. 1983). 
39. See, e.g., Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Volid v. 
Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.W.2d 42 (1972); Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 
591,428 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973). 
40. See, e.g., Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975); Posner v. 
Posner, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d 
629 (1978); if. Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 116 A.2d 145 (1955) (property agree-
ment invalid since the wife did not understand it). 
41. See, e.g., Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Matlock v. 
Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d 629 (1978); Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 116 
A.2d 145 (1955). 
42. See, e.g., Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975); Belcher v. 
Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 
679, 576 P.2d 629 (1978); Herman v. Goetz, 204 Kan. 91, 460 P.2d 554 (1969); if. 
Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 116 A.2d 145 (1955) (agreement invalid since the 
husband made no disclosure to his wife before she executed a property settlement 
agreement). But if. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962) (court 
devised two-pronged test: full disclosure or actual knowledge required only if the 
provision is inadequate). The same test was applied in Schutterle v. Schutterle, 
260 N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 1977). See also Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 
(1967) (unfairly disproportionate provision in the absence of disclosure or actual 
knowledge places burden of proving that the agreement was knowingly and vol-
untarily made on the party seeking to enforce it). 
43. Courts also refer to adequacy as conscionability, fairness or reasonableness. See, 
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directly affects the state's interest in spousal support, courts scrutinize it 
with a view toward protecting this interest. Toward this end, courts 
have used four different approaches.44 The first approach, which meas-
ures the adequacy of the provision at the time the contract was exe-
cuted, will validate the agreement if it was fair at the time it was 
made.45 The second approach requires that the provision be adequate 
at both the time of execution and enforcement.46 The third approach 
measures adequacy only at the time of enforcement, finding unconscio-
nability when enforcement results in insufficient financial means for the 
spouse.47 The fourth approach measures adequacy at the time of exe-
cution, but permits modification at the time of enforcement.48 
The third area of concern is allocating the burden of proving the 
validity of the agreement. Courts have used several different ap-
proaches with no clear trend evolving. One court has allocated the bur-
den to the husband, under the clear and convincing standard of 
proof.49 Another court has held that there is a presumption of validity 
unless circumstances show otherwise. 50 Another court has developed a 
e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 
143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962). 
44. See Note, supra note 12, at 235 n.33. 
45. See Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975); accordVolid v. 
Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972) (court stated that it would con-
strue, not make, contracts); Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d 629 
(1978) (court enforced agreement that waived alimony because there was full dis-
closure and the wife understood the agreement and had participated in the negoti-
ations); if. Herman v. Goetz, 204 Kan. 91, 460 P.2d 554 (1969) (court enforced 
property agreement, noting that the wife had actual knowledge of her husband's 
financial affairs). 
46. See Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Under this 
agreement the wife received $200,000 in lieu of alimony. The parties had met one 
month before the wedding and the marriage lasted 16 months. The court found 
the agreement fair and reasonable under the circumstances. 
47. Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 734 (Colo. 1982); see also Unander v. 
Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973) (antenuptial agreement should be en-
forced unless it deprives a spouse of needed support not otherwise obtainable). 
48. Courts using this method have applied different standards for allowing modifica-
tion. In 1962, the Supreme Court of Florida developed a fairness test under which 
a provision was considered fair if it enabled the dependent spouse to maintain a 
similar standard of living as in marriage. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 
17, 20 (Fla. 1962). Later, in Posner v. Posner, 257 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1972), the 
same court, in accordance with state law, permitted modification for a change in 
circumstances, which it noted was the same standard used for modifying post-
nuptial agreements. Other courts have held that the issue of support is a matter 
for judicial determination and, therefore, even a valid antenuptial agreement is 
subject to judicial review. Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810, 
816 (1981); if. Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331, 352 N.E.2d 785 (1976) 
(valid antenuptial agreement just one factor used in considering an award for 
support); Flora v. Flora, 166 Ind. App. 620, 337 N.E.2d 846 (1975) (court not 
bound to accept terms of valid antenuptial agreement). 
49. Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975). 
50. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331, 352 N.E.2d 785 (1976); 
Flora v. Flora, 166 Ind. App. 620, 337 N.E.2d 846 (1975). 
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rule that interrelates the requirements of disclosure and adequacy. It 
held that while ordinarily the burden is on the party alleging invalidity, 
if the provision is facially unreasonable, a presumption of concealment 
arises that shifts the burden to the other party. 51 
Prior to Frey, Maryland courts were not concerned with proving 
the validity of antenuptial agreements affecting support because the 
agreements were per se invalid. Levy v. Sherman, 52 a 1945 decision by 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, established a standard to determine 
the validity of antenuptial agreements affecting property rights. The 
Levy court first noted that the parties to an antenuptial agreement have 
a confidential relationship, imposing a duty on each to make a frank, 
full, and truthful disclosure. Then it applied a two-pronged test: if the 
disclosure is inadequate and the provision in the agreement is unfairly 
disproportionate to the other's financial worth, an implication of fraud 
arises placing a burden on the one seeking enforcement to show that it 
was knowingly and voluntarily executed, with the opportunity to ob-
tain independent legal advice. 53 
Twenty-two years later, the court of appeals applied the Levy test 
in Hartz v. Hartz. 54 The Hartz court enforced an antenuptial agree-
ment that preserved the premarital property interests of the husband 
and wife. Further, the court delineated the factors for testing agree-
ments in the absence of adequate disclosure or knowledge. First, the 
agreement must be fair and equitable under the circumstances.55 This 
is determined by comparing the benefit gained with the rights relin-
quished, measured at the time the agreement was formed. Second, the 
repudiator must have executed it freely and understandingly.56 If these 
two requirements are met, disclosure or knowledge is not necessary, 
even though the parties have a confidential relationship.57 
In Frey v. Frey, 5 8 the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed this 
issue for the first time since Cohn v. Cohn. 59 Expressly overruling 
Cohn, the Frey court held that antenuptial agreements waiving alimony 
51. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20-21 (Fla. 1962); accord Posner v. 
Posner, 257 So. 2d 530, 534 (Fla. 1972) (where the provision for the wife was 
disproportionate to the husband's wealth at the time of making the agreement, the 
burden shifted to the husband). 
52. 185 Md. 63, 43 A.2d 25 (1945). 
53. Id at 73-74, 43 A.2d at 29. The court found the agreement valid and enforced it. 
54. 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 ( 1967). The wife, who had a great deal of financial and 
business acumen, initiated and negotiated the agreement to protect her own estate. 
The agreement was later similarly altered to protect the husband's estate. The 
parties thereafter executed the agreement. Therefore, there was no doubt that the 
wife fully understood the terms and effect of the agreement, and that she signed it 
voluntarily. Id at 50-54, 234 A.2d at 867-70. 
55. Id at 58, 234 A.2d at 871-72. 
56. Id 
57. Id 
58. 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984). 
59. 209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956). 
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are not void per seas contrary to public policy.60 The court adopted the 
majority trend's view that public policy concerning marriage and di-
vorce has changed since its decision in Cohn.61 The court noted that 
divorce has become commonplace62 and that the state has no interest in 
preserving a marriage that has deteriorated beyond reconciliation.63 In 
addition, the state's interest in spousal support is no longer advanced 
by the traditional view of the husband as provider and the wife as 
homemaker. The expanding employment opportunities for women 
have moderated the husband's duty of support.64 In view of these so-
cial changes, the court abandoned the Cohn prohibition as not respon-
sive to current public interests. Rather, the court reasoned that these 
interests can be better served by independently evaluating the validity 
of each agreement. 65 
The Frey court found legislative expression to support its decision 
in Maryland's Marital Property Act.66 This statute concerns property 
distribution in divorce proceedings and permits the exclusion of marital 
property and family use personal property by valid agreement of the 
parties. The court thus reasoned that antenuptial agreements are fa-
vored in law, and should be enforced if valid.67 A dissent, however, 
argued that the Marital Property Act68 does not enunciate public policy 
concerning alimony, but instead merely codifies earlier decisional law 
that validated agreements disposing of property.69 
In Frey, the court of appeals adopted a flexible approach to deter-
mine the validity of antenuptial agreements by replacing the absolute 
prohibition with a case by case determination.70 The validity of an 
agreement is determined by an application of the Hartz test/ 1 which 
required either disclosure or a fair agreement voluntarily and under-
standingly made. The Frey court, however, has expanded the scope of 
this test in several respects. 
First, the Frey court's language indicates that all the Hartz factors 
are mandatory.72 This is in direct contradiction of the two-pronged ap-
60. Frey, 298 Md. at 558, 471 A.2d at 708. 
61. Id. at 561, 471 A.2d at 710. 
62. /d. at 560, 471 A.2d at 709. 
63. /d. This is evidenced by a state law that provides for voluntary separation and 
divorce. Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 7-103(a)(3) (1984). 
64. Frey, 298 Md. at 560, 471 A.2d at 709 (quoting Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 
391, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46-47 (1972)). 
65. Frey, 298 Md. at 563, 471 A.2d at 711. 
66. Id. at 562-63, 471 A.2d at 710 (construing Mo. CTs. & Juo. PROC. CooE ANN. 
§ 3-6A-01(c), (e) (1984)). 
67. Frey, 298 Md. at 563, 471 A.2d at 710. 
68. MD. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CoDE ANN.§ 3-6A-01 to -08 (1984). 
69. Frey, 298 Md. at 565,471 A.2d at 711-12 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
70./d. at563,471 A.2dat71l. 
71. /d. at 564,471 A.2d at 711. 
72. /d. at 564-65, 471 A.2d at 711. The court listed the factors: 
The agreement must be fair and equitable in procurement and result. 
The parties must make frank, full, and truthful disclosure of all their 
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proach of Hartz, which waived the disclosure requirement in the face 
of a fair provision.73 Second, one factor requires that the agreement be 
fair and equitable in result.74 Result can be measured as of the time of 
contract formation, as in Hartz,75 or at the time of contract effect, 
which is at separation or divorce. Although the court's language is 
somewhat ambiguous, the latter approach is more consistent with the 
common usage of the word "result."76 Thus, it is arguable that the Frey 
court did not intend a strict application of the Hartz factors. Rather, 
expressly following the Hartz lead, the Frey court has developed a pref-
erable, albeit slightly different approach for testing the validity of 
agreements affecting support. Since neither support needs nor the abil-
ity to pay support can be determined in advance, the fairness of a sup-
port provision before marriage is irrelevant. Accordingly, measuring 
the adequacy of the provision at the time of its application is a more 
analytically sound approach, and is more responsive to the state's inter-
est in the adequate support of its citizens. 
Despite the improvements in Maryland law, Frey presents several 
problems. First, one of the reasons support needs are unforeseeable is 
that family needs constantly change. In response to this fluctuating 
economic variable, support provisions must be subject to modification. 
Currently, Maryland law does not permit the modification of antenup-
tial agreements, although a court does have discretion to alter alimony 
provisions in both separation agreements and divorce decrees. 77 The 
General Assembly needs to resolve this issue to protect the state's inter-
est in spousal support. 
Second, the Frey court left unanswered the question of which 
party has the burden of proving the validity of the agreement. The 
court of appeals has stated that a confidential relationship exists be-
tween the parties, but did not explain the effect of this relationship. 
The question is further confused in light of recent decisions by the 
court of special appeals that have abrogated the presumption of a confi-
dential relationship between spouses.78 Whether the Frey court in-
assets. The agreement must be 'entered into voluntarily, freely, and with 
full knowledge of its meaning and effect.' Further, we have emphasized 
the importance of independent legal advice in evaluating whether the 
agreement was voluntarily and understandingly made. Also, in evaluat-
ing the disclosure and procurement of the agreement, the trial judge 
must remember that the parties stand in a confidential relationship. 
Id. (citing Hartz, 248 Md. at 56, 234 A.2d at 870 (emphasis supplied)). 
73. Hartz, 248 Md. at 58, 234 A.2d at 871-72; see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying 
text. 
74. Frey, 298 Md. at 563, 471 A.2d at 711. 
75. Hartz, 248 Md. at 57, 234 A.2d at 871. 
76. "Result" means "a consequence, effect, issue or conclusion." WEBSTER's THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1937 (1976). 
77. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§§ 8-103, l1-107(b) (1984). 
78. Bell v. Bell, 38 Md. App. 10, 13, 379 A.2d 419, 421 (1977), cert. denied, 282 Md. 
729 (1978). A confidential relationship exists when the relationship between the 
parties is such that the wife would assume that her husband would only act con-
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tended to advocate the presumption in the antenuptial context is 
unclear, but it is inconsistent to presume a confidential relationship be-
tween unmarried persons and deny it as between a husband and wife. 
Third, the Frey court's reliance on the Maryland Marital Property 
Act as a definitive expression of legislative intent to validate antenup-
tial agreements is misplaced. While the Marital Property Act is the 
appropriate vehicle for interpreting agreements concerning property, it 
is irrelevant in the alimony context.79 
Fourth, the court of appeals in Frey has shown a willingness to 
refashion an outmoded rule in accordance with current public inter-
ests. 80 The result in Frey is consistent with the court's perception of the 
changes in societal perceptions concerning divorce, and the court was 
correct in its decision to eliminate the absolute bar to antenuptial 
agreements contemplating divorce. By requiring full disclosure in 
every agreement and that fairness be measured at the time of separa-
tion or divorce, the Frey court has correctly mandated a stricter validity 
test for agreements effecting support. Further, since support needs can-
not be accurately foreseen, measuring the fairness of the provision at 
the time of its effect is more apt to result in adequate support and, 
therefore, is more responsive to the state's interest in spousal support. 
Once a means of modifying these agreements is provided, the new ap-
proach will prove to be an equitable balance between individual and 
state interests. 
Kathryn Lego Armiger 
sistently with her welfare. McClellan v. McClellan, 52 Md. App. 525, 531, 451 
A.2d 334, 338 (1982). When a confidential relationship exists the burden shifts to 
the husband to prove that the agreement was fair. Absent proof of a confidential 
relationship, a separation agreement is presumed valid. Id. at 531, 451 A.2d at 
338-39 (citing Cronin v. Hebditch, 195 Md. 607, 74 A.2d 50 (1950)). 
79. Frey, 298 Md. at 565, 471 A.2d at 711-12 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
80. That the court has the power and authority to do so is well-established. I d. at 562, 
471 A.2d at 707-08 (citing Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983)). 
